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Operation Pamphlet, also called Convoy Pamphlet, was a convoy operation of World War II conducted during January and February 1943 to transport the Australian Army's 9th Division home from Egypt. The convoy involved five transports, which were protected from Japanese warships during their trip across the Indian Ocean and along the Australian coastline by several Allied naval task forces. The 9th Division boarded the ships during late January 1943, and the convoy operation began on 4 February. No contact was made between Allied and Japanese ships, and the 9th Division arrived in Australian ports during late February with no losses from enemy action. The operation was initiated after the British and United States governments agreed to the Australian Government's request that the 9th Division be transferred to Australia, thereby ending the Second Australian Imperial Force's role in the North African Campaign. The division had seen extensive combat in North Africa, but was needed to bolster the forces available for planned offensive operations in the Pacific. After its return to Australia, the 9th Division was retrained for jungle warfare and made an important contribution to operations conducted in New Guinea during late 1943. ==Background== During 1940 and 1941, three infantry divisions and other units assigned to I Corps of the Second Australian Imperial Force (AIF) were transported to the Middle East, where they took part in several campaigns against German, Italian and French forces.〔Faulkner and Wilkinson (2012), p. 168〕〔(【引用サイトリンク】url=https://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/ww2/ )〕 Following the outbreak of the Pacific War, the corps headquarters and the 6th and 7th Divisions were returned to Australia in early 1942 to bolster the country's defences; the movement of these troops was designated Operation Stepsister. The Australian Government agreed to British and US requests to temporarily retain the 9th Division in the Middle East in exchange for the deployment of additional United States Army units to Australia and Britain's support for a proposal to expand the Royal Australian Air Force to 73 squadrons.〔Hasluck (1970), pp. 73–87, 177〕 That year, the 9th Division played an important role in the First Battle of El Alamein during July 1942 and the Second Battle of El Alamein between 23 October and 4 November.〔Coates (2006), pp. 166–176〕 The division suffered many casualties during the latter engagement, and did not take part in the pursuit of the retreating Axis forces.〔Long (1973), pp. 283–284〕 Several factors influenced the decision made by the Australian Government in October 1942 to recall the 9th Division to Australia. Firstly, the Government and the commander of the Australian Military Forces, General Thomas Blamey, wanted to relieve the 6th and 7th Divisions from combat in the New Guinea Campaign and Blamey considered the 9th Division to be better prepared for this responsibility than his militia forces or US Army units.〔Hasluck (1970), pp. 193, 202〕 Secondly, the commander of Allied forces in the South West Pacific Area, General Douglas MacArthur, had been pressing the US and Australian Governments for reinforcements to conduct offensive operations against Japanese positions. Other factors influencing the decision were a desire to concentrate the Australian Army in a single theatre, the increasing difficulty in finding replacements for the 9th Division's casualties given the Army's manpower shortages, the political difficulties associated with implementing reforms to permit militia units to serve outside Australian territory, and concerns that a prolonged absence from Australia would affect morale among the 9th Division's soldiers.〔Hasluck (1970), pp. 193–194〕 On 17 October 1942, Australian Prime Minister John Curtin cabled British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to request that the 9th Division be returned to Australia. In the cable Curtin stated that, owing to Australia's manpower shortage and the demands of the war in the Pacific, it was no longer possible to provide enough reinforcements to sustain the division in the Middle East. The British Government initially resisted this request on the grounds that the 9th Division was required for the upcoming offensive at El Alamein. On 29 October (six days into the battle) Curtin again cabled Churchill, stating that Australia needed the division in the Pacific and in a fit state to participate in offensive operations.〔Long (1973), p. 285〕 On 1 November, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote to Curtin proposing to send an additional army division to Australia if the Australian Government agreed to retain the 9th Division in the Middle East. Curtin, acting on the advice of MacArthur, responded to Roosevelt on 16 November rejecting this suggestion, and again requested that the 9th Division be returned.〔Maughan (1966), p. 749〕 On 21 November, the commander of the 9th Division, Major General Leslie Morshead, was informed by General Harold Alexander, the commander-in-chief of the Middle East Command, that a decision had been made to return the division to Australia.〔 Churchill subsequently told the Australian Government on 2 December that while he was prepared to recommend to Roosevelt that the 9th Division be returned, the resultant diversion of shipping would reduce the size of the build-up of United States military personnel in Britain and North Africa by 30,000 men. In the same cable, Churchill also stated that due to a shortage of shipping the 9th Division's heavy equipment would need to remain in the Middle East.〔Hasluck (1970), p. 201〕 On 3 December Roosevelt again wrote to Curtin to suggest that the 9th Division remain in the Middle East until the final defeat of the Axis forces in North Africa. Roosevelt also informed Curtin that the United States Army's 25th Infantry Division would be transferred to Australia during December.〔〔 Following these messages the Government sought advice from Blamey and MacArthur on whether it was necessary for the 9th Division to return with its heavy equipment, and was informed that the necessary supplies could be sourced from American resources once the unit arrived in Australia.〔Maughan (1966), p. 750〕 Curtin replied to Churchill and Roosevelt on 8 December, and again stressed the need to return the 9th Division to Australia as soon as possible to make good the Army's losses to tropical diseases and prepare for future offensives in the Pacific. In his message he agreed to leave the division's heavy equipment in the Middle East, and requested only that it travel with items necessary to quickly re-enter combat in the South West Pacific.〔Hasluck (1970), p. 202〕 No further debate took place, and on 15 December Churchill informed Curtin that shipping would be made available in late January to transport the division and a small portion of its equipment to Australia.〔 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Operation Pamphlet」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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